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Being able to make correct novel predictions has long been trumpeted as one of 
the most important virtues a scientific theory could have. Imre Lakatos (1970, 
pp. 91-195) has even gone so far as to claim that a research program can 
supersede its rival only by making some correct novel predictions. Others have 
based an entire defense of realism on the claim that realism is the only adequate 
explanation of the success of scientific theories, particularly their success in 
making correct novel predictions. 1  For still others, the ability of the theories of 
science to make correct novel predictions (and hence be tested) is what separates 
science from other explanatory enterprises, such as history, economics, natural 
theology,  and psychoanalysis. 2 
From Christopher Clavius in the sixteenthcentury to the present, the ability ofa 
theory to make correct novel predictions has been accorded, at the very least, a 
special epistemic value: in addition to Clavius, one can cite authors as diverse as 
Leibniz,  Robert Boyle,  William Whewell,  C. S. Peirce,  and more recently 
Lakatos and Ronald Giere among others.3 Specifically, many philosophers have 
claimed that, everything else being equal, we should have more confidence in a 
theory ifit correctly predicts a set ofdata, or phenomena, than ifit accommodates 
the data.4 Indeed, in a recent article Michael Gardner tells us that this position is 
part of a "lengthy tradition-not to say consensus-in the philosophy ofscience" 
(Gardner, 1982, p. 1). There have been a few dissenters from this tradition, 
however, most notably John Maynard Keynes. For instance, in response to C. S. 
Peirce, Keynes writes: "The peculiar virtue of prediction or predesignation is 
altogether imaginary" (1921, p. 305). I too am one of the dissenters: I shall argue 
that Keynes is basicallyright, that at least when it comes to the truth ofa theory, the 






the details of my argument, however, it will be helpful to consider some reasons 
classically presented for and against giving prediction a special epistemic status. 
Those who want to attach a special epistemic value to prediction typically 
contend that, everything else being equal, scientists put more confidence in a 
theory that predicts some phenomenon than one that was merely designed to 
account for that phenomenon. In support of this contention, they cite various 
historical examples in which the scientists involved in judging the merits of a 
theory seem to have attached a special epistemic value to prediction. Consider, for 
instance, the famous case cited by Ronald Giere, that of Fresnel's wave theory of 
diffraction, and its prediction of a bright spot at the center of a shadow produced by 
a circular disk (1983, pp. 279-87). According to Giere's rendition of the episode, 
in the years 1810 to 1818, the French Academy of Sciences offered a prize for the 
best treatment of diffraction, a prize that Fresnel eventually won for his wave 
model. Initially, the Commission was not persuaded by the evidence Fresnel 
presented, partly, no doubt, because most members of the Commission (e.g., 
Laplace, Poisson, and Biot) were advocates of the particle theory of light. A 
correct novel prediction of Fresnel's model discovered by Poisson, however, 
eventually persuaded the Commission. Poisson applied Fresnel's model to the case 
of a shadow produced by a circular disk and concluded that the resulting diffraction 
pattern should have a bright spot at the center. According to current particle 
models, such a bright spot was not supposed to appear. And, apparently, the 
members of the Commission did not expect it to appear; indeed, they thought this 
prediction of the bright spot was a reductio of Fresnel's model. When, however, 
Francois Arago performed the experiment, and the bright spot appeared as   pre- 
dicted, the commissioners  were persuaded  to give the prize to  Fresnel. 
According to Giere, it was because Fresnel's model predicted the bright spot 
that the commissioners were persuaded. Giere implies that if the appearance of 
such a bright spot were common knowledge at the time Fresnel developed his 
model, and he specifically developed his model to account for the bright spot, it 
is unlikely that the members of the Commission would have been persuaded. For, 
Giere notes, they were not persuaded by Fresnel's success in explaining the 
diffraction pattern of straight edges, a pattern which, by Fresnel's own account, 
he designed his model to account for. Hence, Giere claims, it seems that in the 
case of the bright spot, the commissioners considered prediction to have more 
epistemic value than  accommodation. 
On the other hand, the opponents of attaching a special epistemic value to 
prediction argue that the way in which a theory was discovered or constructed, or 
when it was developed, is not, in and of itself, relevant to whether or not it is 
true.  For instance, according to Keynes, 
 
It is the union of prior knowledge, with the inductive grounds which arise out of the 
immediate instances, that lends weight to an hypothesis, and not the occasion on 





Thus, according to Keynes, what determines the probability of a theory being 
true is what he elsewhere calls "general considerations"; hence, he claims, the 
information that a theory predicted, instead of accommodated, a set of data is 
epistemically relevant only insofar as it provides us with relevant information 
about these general considerations: 
 
The fact that the theory which precedes the statistics is more likely than the other to 
be supported by general considerations-for it has not, presumably, been adopted for 
no reason at all-constitutes the only valid ground for this preference. If it does not 
receive more support than the other from general considerations, then the circum- 
stances of its origin are no argument  in its favor.  (l 921,  pp.  305-306) 
 
I shall call these "general considerations" the structural/ relational features of 
a theory; these are the features pertaining to the structure of the theory, its 
relation to background theories and assumptions, and its relation to the relevant 
extant empirical data, but not pertaining to how or when it was discovered or 
constructed.s 
As it stands, the argument for each position is less than entirely convincing. 
Regarding the first argument, scientists could be mistaken in attaching a special 
epistemic value to prediction, or philosophers could be misinterpreting what the 
scientists are doing.6 As for Keynes's argument, he seems to take it as obvious 
that, apart from providing us with information regarding the structural/relational 
features of a theory, the origin of a theory is irrelevant to its truth. But consider- 
ing that many philosophers and others disagree with Keynes, it is not obvious 
that he is right. His claim needs to be argued for, not merely stated. I shall 
present a two stage argument for his position. First, I shall present a direct 
argument for his position; second, I shall attempt to expose the mistaken (as I see 
it) assumptions underlying the opposing  position. 
 
II 
Making the Claims More Precise 
I shall use 'SEP' to denote the claim that prediction has some special epistemic 
status, and '-SEP' to denote the opposing claim. The first order of business is to 
make SEP more precise. To do this, we first need precise definitions of "accom- 
modation"  and "prediction." 
 
Definitions 
Prediction: Let H be a scientific theory, let B0 represent some subset of 
the background information available at the time H was developed, and let Q 
be some phenomena or data not entailed by B0 alone.7  Theory H predicts Q 
if there exists a B0 such that H&B 0 entails Q, and H (when conjoined with 
B0) was not designed to entail Q. H correctly predicts Q if H predicts Q and 





Accommodation: Same as prediction except that H (when conjoined with 
B0 ) was specifically designed to entail Q.8 (For convenience, throughout the 
rest of this paper I shall say H entails Q instead of H&B 0 entails Q, although 
the latter is always  meant.) 
 
Two remarks are in order regarding the above definitions. First, the above 
definitions do not require that a theory H be propounded prior to the discovery of 
Q in order for it to predict Q. For example, the degree of the precession of the 
perihelion of Mercury was already known before the development of general 
relativity, but, because general relativity was not designed to entail the correct 
amount of precession, it is nonetheless usually considered to have correctly 
predicted it. 
Second, given the above definitions, what differentiates accommodation from 
prediction is the occurrence of certain psychological processes in those who 
developed H: namely, those processes involved in attempting to construct H in 
such a way that it entails Q (for making such an attempt, and succeeding, is just 
what it means to design H to entail Q). If those psychological processes occurred, 
then H accommodates Q; if they did not occur, then H predicts Q. Whether or not 
prediction has any epistemic value over accommodation, therefore, depends 
entirely on whether or not, in general, the information that such processes oc- 
curred should decrease our confidence in the truth of H, given that we already 
know that H entails Q. I shall argue that such information should not,  as a 
general rule, decrease our confidence in H's truth, and thus that prediction has no 
special epistemic value. 
Besides clarifying the definitions, we need to clarify the nature of the debate 
over the epistemic value of prediction. To begin with, all sides to the debate 
agree that knowing that a theory predicted, instead of accommodated, a set of 
data can give us an additional reason for believing it is true by telling us some- 
thing about the structural/relational features of the theory. 9 For, because of the 
natural tendency to add special (ad hoc) hypotheses to a theory to make it 
account for a set of data, it is a rather trivial point that, everything else being 
equal, we should expect a theory that predicts a set of data to provide a more 
unified (or simple) account of the data than one that accommodates it. Thus, as 
Michael Gardner (1982, pp. 1-15), Paul Horwich (1982, pp. 110-17), and  
George Schlesinger (1987, pp. 33-42) make clear, and as can be seen from the 
passage from Keynes cited above, the real issue behind the debate is whether or 
not prediction has some epistemic value over and above that resulting from our 
lack of knowledge of the structural/ relationalfeatures of a theory. Put differently, 
the issue is whether or not the information that a theory predicted, instead of 
accommodated, a set of data should increase our confidence in the theory given 
that we already know the relevant structural! relational features of the theory. The 
proponents of the special epistemic value of prediction (SEP) say it should; the 





To see the issue more clearly, consider a concrete illustration. Suppose you are 
an expert on general relativity (GR): you know all about its structure (for in- 
stance, its various equations and their interrelations with one another) and all the 
known data it is purported to explain; but, because of some doubts about whether 
Einstein knew of the correct degree to which light bends around the sun before 
his final development of GR in 1915, you do not know whether GR accommo- 
dated or predicted the correct degree of bending. Now suppose you discovered 
that GR actually predicted, instead of accommodated, the bending. The propo- 
nents of SEP would say that your discovery should have increased your confi- 
dence in the truth of GR; the opponents  would say that it should    not. 
Before presenting my argument against SEP, it is worthwhile to look a little 
more closely at how the information that a theory predicted a set of data might 
tell us something about the structural/relational features of the theory relevant to 
its truth. Generally, if H predicts Q it is also a good, or even the best, explanation 
of the other relevant extant data E. For, since H was not designed to entail Q, its 
initial merit (before it was found to account for Q) would rest solely on its ability 
to explain E. For example, Fresnel's wave model of light must have been a 
reasonable explanation of the various properties of light known in 1810 before 
the discovery of the bright spot mentioned above, for, otherwise, it is very 
unlikely Fresnel would have proposed it or anyone would have taken it seriously. 
On the other hand, if H accommodates Q, it will not necessarily be a very good 
explanation of the other extant data E: other theories might explain E much 
better, but they are ruled out because they cannot account for Q. Thus, the fact 
that H predicts Q tells us that H has a certain important merit that, ifH accommo- 
dates Q, we have no reason to expect it to have: namely, the merit of being a 
good, or the best, explanation  of  E. 
I shall call this merit "unifying power," for I think it is a precise way of 
spelling out at least part of what philosophers such as Michael Friedman (1983) 
mean by theoretical unification. It is also easy to see why one might think that this 
sort of unifying power gives us a reason to believe a theory is true. Consider a 
theory H that both entails Q and entails E. From a realist perspective, if, besides 
merely entailing E, H is a good explanation of E, it is reasonably likely that H is 
true on evidence E alone. But this will not be the case if H fails to provide a good 
explanation of E. Hence, assuming that the boost of confirmation H gets from Q 
(by virtue of the fact it entails Q) does not significantly depend on how well it 
explains E, H will be more probable on E & Q if it is a good explanation of E 
than if it is not. It follows, therefore, that H is more probable on E & Q if it 
unifies E & Q than it would otherwise be. So, from a realist perspective, it is 
easy to see why this sort of unifying  power is considered  a  merit. 
Finally, to illustrate the above points, it is worth looking at a case in which the 
above considerations regarding the structure of a theory can come into play in 





some special epistemic value. Consider Freud's psychoanalytic theory and Karl 
Popper's criticism of it. Karl Popper criticized Freud's theory because it could 
account for practically any case of human behavior; thus, he concluded, its 
ability to account for any individual case of behavior does not really confirm it. 
For instance, Popper cites how Freud's theory could account for two opposing 
behaviors (a man who deliberately drowns a child and a man who sacrifices his 
life to save a child) by means of repression and sublimation, respectively  (1963,  
p. 35). From our perspective, it is easy to see why the behaviors Freud's theory 
"explained" do not count much in its favor. The problem is not that Freud's 
theory accommodated these behaviors, but rather that, strictly speaking, in ac- 
counting for them, his theory changes: that is, to account for them, the person 
using Freud's theory must change his theory by adding new hypotheses to it- 
e.g., hypotheses concerning who is suffering from repression and who from 
sublimation. 10 Consequently, the support coming from the additional behavior 
this new, changed theory explains is at least partially offset by its added complex- 
ity as compared to the old theory. Accordingly, in opposition to what one might 
initially think, it is not necessarily because Freud's theory accommodates, in- 
stead of predicts, a behavior that the behavior does not count in favor of the 
theory; rather, it might be because his theory must be made more complex to 
account for the new behavior. 
 
The Argument Against SEP 
Now, as stressed above, the fundamental issue underlying the accommoda- 
tion/prediction debate is whether or not the information that a theory predicted 
instead of accommodated a set of data should increase our confidence in its truth 
given that we already know the relevant structural/relational features of the 
theory. I shall argue that it should not. First, I shall argue that there is no 
plausible, non-mysterious way in which the information that a theory predicted, 
instead of accommodated, a set of data could affect our confidence in the truth of 
a theory, except by telling us something about the structural/relational features of 
the theory-something excluded by the stipulation made above that we already 
know these features. Second, I shall argue that the reasons commonly offered for 
thinking that prediction  has some special epistemic value  fail. 
As mentioned above, what distinguishes H's accommodating Q from H's 
predicting Q is the occurrence of certain psychological processes in those who 
constructed H, namely, those processes involved in attempting to construct H in 
such a way that it entails Q. So, given, as we are assuming, that we already know 
that H entails Q (since this is one of the structural/relational features of H), the 
information that H accommodates Q is equivalent to the information that the 
above mentioned psychological processes took place, whereas the information 
that H predicts Q is equivalent to the information that they did not take place. We 





their occurrence corresponds to the case of accommodation), and P denote the 
claim that they did not take place (since their non-occurrence corresponds to the 
case of prediction). 
Now, given that we know the relevant structural/relational featu!es of H as 
stipulated above, neither the information that A is true, nor the information that P 
is true, could affect our confidence in the truth of H by affecting our confidence 
in the structural/relational features of H. Hence, the only way such information 
could affect our confidence in the truth of H is by directly affecting our confi- 
dence as to whether or not the physical states of affairs that H asserts obtain, 
actually obtain.11 For instance, given that we know the structural/relational 
features of general relativity (GR), the only way that the information that Ein- 
stein had certain intentions (e.g., those corresponding to the case of accommoda- 
tion) could affect our confidence in GR is by affecting our confidence in the 
existence of those states of affairs that GR asserts obtain-e.g., the states  of 
affairs consisting of free particles following geodesics, of space-time being 
curved to the degree given by Einstein's field equations,  and   the like. 
So, our question is, How can the information (i.e., either A or P) that certain 
psychological processes did or did not take place in the mind of those who 
developed H affect our confidence as to whether or not the relevant physical 
states of affairs obtain? To begin answering this question, consider two arbitrary 
concrete state of affairs, S1 and S2 . Usually, the information  that S1  obtains 
would rationally affect our confidence that S2 obtains by what I shall call C-af- 
fecting our confidence, where the information that S1 obtains C-affects our confi- 
dence that S2 obtains if and only if it (rationally) affects our confidence in S2 
obtaining because we believe, or suspect, that there is some (relevant) causal or 
lawlike connection between S1 obtaining or not obtaining, and S2 obtaining or 
not obtaining. For example, given that we did not already know that Jane is a 
smoker, the information that Jane has lung cancer (S 1) typically would (ratio- 
nally) affect our confidence that she is a smoker (S 2) because we believe, or 
suspect, that there is some causal, or lawlike connection between smoking and 
lung cancer; it is the believed or suspected causal connection that makes the one 
state of affairs relevant to the other: if we did not believe or suspect that there was 
such a connection, the fact that Jane has lung cancer should be no more relevant 
to her being a smoker than, say, to her having blond    hair. 
Alternatively, consider a jury deliberating about whether or not a defendant 
intended to murder the victim. Pieces of evidence such as a fired gun, alcohol in 
the bloodstream, or fingerprints normally would be relevant. The reason is that 
we know of various relevant causal or lawlike connections between intending to 
murder and these sorts of facts-for example, we know that alcohol in the 
bloodstream tends to make people lose control, and thus in many circumstances 
can lead people to murder, or intend to murder. In contrast, such pieces of 
evidence as that the defendant ate glazed doughnuts for breakfast would normally 





lawlike connection between the eating of glazed doughnuts and intending to 
murder. 
Now, in order to determine whether the information that A is true (or the 
information that P is true) could C-affect our confidence in the truth of H, we 
need to consider the various types of causal connections that might exist between 
the (psychological) state of affairs corresponding to A (or to P) and the states of 
affairs that H asserts obtain. 12 For concreteness, let H  be general  relativity  
(GR), and let A be the claim that Einstein attempted to find a theory (general 
relativity) that entails the correct degree to which light bends around the sun, and 
let P be the claim that Einstein did not make such an attempt. The question we 
then need to consider is: What relevant causal or lawlike connections might exist 
between the states of affairs that GR asserts are actual-such  as that space-time  
is  curved-and  the  relevant  psychological  occurrences   corresponding  to  A, 
or to P? 
One relevant causal or lawlike connection is the one between the states of 
affairs that GR asserts are actual and certain experimental data Einstein or some 
other scientist in the community had access to, data which in tum is relevantly 
connected to Einstein's intentions. For instance, if space-time is really curved to 
the degree GR says it is, then this fact will be causally responsible for the degree 
to which light bends around the sun. This degree of bending, in tum, could be 
relevantly connected, in a lawlike way, to Einstein's intentions: e.g.,  if  the 
degree of bending was measured before 1915, and Einstein knew about the 
measurement, it is likely he would have attempted to make GR entail the correct 
degree of bending. 
Consequently, because of this lawlike connection, knowing that Einstein at- 
tempted to make GR entail the correct degree of bending could give us reason to 
believe that GR actually does entail it, and thereby give us additional reason to 
believe in GR. However, this could only be the case if we did not already know 
that GR entails the correct degree of bending; but this is something we do know 
since, by assumption, we know the relevant structural/relational features of GR. 
Thus, the information that A is true (or the information that P is true) cannot 
affect our confidence in the truth of GR in this   way. 
Certainly, however, given the complexity of causal connections in the world, 
there are probably a myriad of other ways in which, for instance, the curvature of 
space-time is connected in a causal or lawlike way with Einstein's psychological 
state, much as it is probably connected to the number of hairs Einstein had on his 
head, or what he usually ate for breakfast. But there is no reason to believe or 
suspect that any of these ways is relevant: knowing the relevant intentions of 
Einstein when constructing GR should no more affect our confidence in the truth 
of GR (because we believe or suspect that this myriad of causal connections 
exists) than knowing that Einstein ate oatmeal for breakfast should affect our 
confidence in the truth of GR (because we recognize there is probably a myriad 





oatmeal). So, I conclude, the information that A is true (or the information that P 
is true) does not C-ajfect our confidence in GR given that we know the relevant 
structural/relational features of GR as stipulated   above. 
Of course, there are other ways that the information that one fact is the case 
can (rationally) affect our confidence that another fact is the case, besides C-af- 
fecting our confidence. For instance, the information that masses always attract 
each other here on earth gives us some reason to believe they always attract each 
other in other parts of the universe, even parts that are causally disconnected 
from ours, for a universe in which masses always attract each other is simpler 
than one in which they do not. Or, suppose God told us that most true theories 
that either have been or will be produced accommodate the set of data they are (or 
will be) known to entail. In such a situation, the information that A is true (or Pis 
true) would certainly be relevant to the truth of H. Or, again, A (or P) could be 
relevant to the truth of H in some direct, non-causal way, as, for instance, from a 
realist perspective, the simplicity of a theory is relevant to its truth. Nonetheless, 
although these are all possible ways in which the information that A is true or the 
information that P is true could affect our confidence in the truth of H, none of 
them seems very plausible. 
It appears, therefore, that for the typical scientific theory H, there is no non- 
mysterious, plausible way that the information that A is true (or the information 
that Pis true) could (rationally) affect our confidence in the truth of H, given that 
we know the relevant structural/relational features of H as stipulated above. 
Thus, we can conclude, there does not appear to be any plausible, non- 
mysterious way in which prediction could have a special epistemic   value. 
Of course, the fact that we cannot find a non-mysterious connection does not 
prove that there is no connection. For instance, proponents of the special epis- 
temic status of prediction (SEP) could either claim that there is some relevant, 
non-mysterious connection between A (or P) and the truth of H that we have not 
yet discovered, or they could simply claim that the connection is sui generis. 
Although they could do this, I take it to be a methodological rule that one should 
not invoke sui generis relations or claim that there are relations we have not yet 
discovered (even though we have looked very hard) unless one has good grounds 
for doing so. Unless one adopts something like this as a methodological rule, it 
seems that the door is open to all kinds of irrationalism. Moreover, we normally 
act in accordance with this methodological rule: if the prosecution in the "jury" 
example above claims that the defendant's eating glazed doughnuts for breakfast 
is evidence that the defendant intended to murder, we would demand that she 
demonstrate some kind of connection between the eating of glazed doughnuts 
and intending to murder. Clearly, it would not be sufficient for her merely to 
claim that there was some sui generis, or simply unknown, connection between 
the two. Similarly, it is not sufficient for advocates of SEP to claim that there is 
some unknown, or sui generis, connection between prediction and the truth, 









The following is a list of three commonly  offered reasons for   SEP. 
 
Reason 1 
As we saw at the beginning of this paper, one reason often cited in favor of SEP 
is the claim that scientists accord more weight to prediction than accommoda- 
tion. But this fact is perfectly compatible with the denial of SEP, for the tendency 
of scientists to attach more weight to prediction can easily be explained by noting 
that theories that predict a set of data are more likely to provide a unified account 
of the data than ones that merely accommodate the data. What the proponents of 
SEP must show is that scientists do not attach more weight to prediction merely 
because it tells them something about the structural/relational features of a theo- 
ry. As far as I know, no one has shown this. Indeed, historian of science Stephen 
Brush (1989) claims that scientists generally do not attach any special weight to 
prediction, though it should be noted that Brush mainly addresses the issue of the 
special epistemic value of temporally novel predictions such as general rela- 
tivity's prediction of the bending of light around the sun; and, as noted in note 6, 
John Worrall (1989, pp. 135-57) makes a similar claim about Fresnel's novel 
prediction of the bright spot. But, even if someone were to show that scientists 
generally attach a special epistemic value to prediction, it would not count as 
very strong evidence in favor of SEP: the scientists who attach a special epis- 
temic value to prediction could simply be mistaken for the same reasons as 
philosophers who advocate SEP. 
 
Reason 2 
The reason given here is  a  simplification of  that  presented  by Giere (1983, 
pp. 277-92). Giere's basic idea is that if a theory is false, it is unlikely for it to 
correctly predict phenomena, 13 but if it is true, then, in general, it is not unlikely 
for ii to correctly predict phenomena. Thus, our discovery that a theory H 
correctly predicts a phenomenon Q confirms it (i.e., it raises its probability of 
being true). In contrast, he tells us, "It is not in fact unlikely that a model 
designed to accommodate a given result should in fact do so. And this is true no 
matter whether the corresponding hypothesis is true or false" ( p. 286). Thus, in 
contrast to the case of prediction, our discovery that a hypothesis accommodates 
a certain result does not significantly confirm the hypothesis, for it would be 
about as likely to accommodate the result whether it were true or false. Conse- 
quently, in general, prediction confirms a hypothesis more than accommodation. 
The reasoning here is subtly faulty. H correctly predicts Q if and only if the 
following conjunction is true: H entails Q and H was not designed to entail Q and 




entails Q (the first conjunct), since H's entailing Q (given the appropriate back- 
ground information) is a necessary truth. And similarly, in general the truth or 
falsity of H will be practically irrelevant to the truth of the second conjunct: e.g., 
the commissioners would have judged it unlikely that Fresnel deceived them and 
really designed his model to accommodate the bright spot whether or not they 
believed his model was true. Thus, presumably, what makes it unlikely that H 
correctly predicts Q when H is false (but not when it is true) is the last conjunct: 
Q is unlikely to be the case if H is false. For example, if the commissioners had 
believed that Fresnel's wave theory is false, they probably would have thought 
that the existence of the predicted bright spot is very unlikely. But, if Q is 
unlikely if His false, then the conjunction Q is the case and H entails Q and H 
was designed to entail Q will be at least as unlikely, for the probability of a 
conjunction is always less than or equal to the probability of any one of its 
conjuncts. But, this latter conjunction is just the claim that H accommodates Q. 
Thus, if it is unlikely for H to predict Q if it is false, then it is unlikely for H to 
accommodate Q if it is false, for in both cases it is unlikely that Q is the case. 
 
Reason 3 
The third, and I suspect most important, reason that philosophers and scientists 
think SEP is highly plausible is that they implicitly assume that the best (or only 
adequate) explanation of the predictive success of a theory is the hypothesis that 
it is (approximately) true. (This is the assumption underlying what is known as 
the explanatory defense of realism [e.g., see Boyd 1984, p. 49].) That is, if a 
theory H correctly predicts a significant set of data Q, they implicitly assume that 
the best explanation of this fact is that His true; for, they reason, if His false-if 
it does not adequately reflect reality-it would be very unlikely for it to be 
predictively successful. But, if a theory successfully accommodates a set of data, 
it does not seem we need to invoke any hypothesis about the truth of the theory to 
explain this fact: the explanation in this case appears to be merely that it was 
designed to account for the data. So, they conclude, the fact that a theory 
correctly predicts a set of data gives us some special reason to believe that it is 
true, a reason not available in the case of accommodation.14 
This reasoning is faulty. Here is why. The truth of a theory H does not explain 
why it predicts a set of data Q, for a theory H predicts Q if and only if H entails 
Q, and H was not designed to entail Q. If H entails Q, that fact is a necessary 
truth, and therefore would be true whether H is true or false-for example, 
general relativity would still entail the bending of light around the sun even if 
space-time were not curved. So, the hypothesis that H is true does not explain 
why H entails Q. Moreover, neither does it, in general, explain why H was not 
designed to entail Q: for instance, the fact that space-time is curved does not 
explain why Einstein did not design his theory to entail the bending of light 
around the sun. 





Q. But for H to correctly predict Q is just for H to predict Q and for Q to be the 
case. Thus, since the truth of H does not explain the fact that H predicts Q, it can 
only explain why H correctly predicts Q by explaining why Q is the case.15 
Consequently, if the truth of H is the best explanation for why H correctly 
predicts Q, it is because it is the best explanation for why Q is the case. But if the 
truth of H is the best explanation for why Q is the case, it will be the best 
explanation for this fact whether H predicts or accommodates Q. For instance, if 
the curvature postulated by general relativity is the best explanation of the bend- 
ing of light around the sun, it will be the best explanation of this fact whether or 
not general relativity was designed to account for the bending. For to say that 
such a curvature is the best explanation of the bending is simply to say that no 
other postulate explains the bending better, and whether or not this is the case is 
certainly not dependent on how general relativity was developed. Thus, if the 
truth of His the best explanation of why H correctly predicts phenomenon Q, it 
will also be the best explanation for why H accommodates Q, for in both cases 
what is being explained  is why Q is the case. 16 
Conclusion 
The result that prediction does not have any special epistemic value over accom- 
modation (-SEP) is not a trivial result. Here, in brief, are a few of the important 
consequences that follow from -SEP. First, -SEP overturns what Michael Gard- 
ner (1982, p. 1) calls the "lengthy tradition-not to say consensus-in the 
philosophy of science" according to which, everything else being equal, predic- 
tion is of more epistemic value than accommodation. Second, -SEP helps to re- 
establish the confirmation/discovery distinction advocated by the positivists, a 
distinction that has fallen out of favor in recent philosophy of science: as the 
positivists claimed, the probability of a theory being true is not intrinsically 
dependent on the way it was discovered. Third, -SEP undermines any epis- 
temological justification for one of the fundamental claims of Lakatos's theory of 
scientific methodology, namely, the claim that one research program can super- 
sede another only if, in addition to accounting for the data the other research 
program accounts for, it predicts new, unforseen, phenomena. For, if prediction 
does not have any special epistemic value with regard to the truth (or empirical 
adequacy) of a theory, neither does it seem it will have such a value for a research 
program. 17 Thus, although it still might be true, as Lakatos claims, that scientists 
choose one research program in favor of another only if the successor program 
makes some novel predictions, -SEP, and its analogue in terms of empirical 
adequacy, show that this way of selecting programs is not epistemically justifia- 
ble.18 
Finally, -SEP casts doubt on the epistemic value of a common distinction 
between science and other explanatory enterprises such as history, natural theolo- 
gy, economics, and psychoanalysis-the distinction according to which science 




because scientific theories make new predictions, whereas the theories of these 
other enterprises merely account for extant data. For if -SEP is true, as far as the 
truth or the empirical adequacy of a theory is concerned, the ability of a theory to 
make correct new predictions is not what is ultimately important; rather, what is 




'See, for instance,  Richard  Boyd  (1984). 
Notes 
2Karl  Popper is the most well-known  advocate of  this claim. 
3For instance, Whewell writes: "If we can predict new facts which we have not seen, as well as 
explain those we have seen, it must be because our explanation is not a mere formula of observed 
facts, but a truth of a deeper kind" (1860, p. 273). Similarly, in various places Peirce advocates the 
general principle that "A hypothesis can only be received upon the ground of its having been verified 
by successful prediction" (e.g., see Peirce, 1965, 2.739). For Boyle, see Laudan (I 981, p. 79); for 
Clavius, see Jardine (1979, pp. 154-155); for Leibniz, see Leibniz (1969, p. 364); for Lakatos, see 
Lakatos  (1970,  pp. 91-195);  and,  for Giere,  see Giere  (1983). 
4Henceforth, the term "prediction" will be used in opposition to "accommodation," that is, as 
synonymous with "novel prediction": roughly, H predicts Q if and only if H entails Q and H was not 
designed to entail Q, and H accommodates Q if and only if H entails Q and H was designed  to entail 
Q. (More precise definitions  are presented   later.) 
5 For example, the fact that general relativity (GR) entails the bending of light around the sun 
would be included in the structural/relational features of GR, but the fact that it predicted instead of 
accommodated the bending would not, for this latter fact pertains to how the theory was discovered or 
constructed. 
Also, the structural/relational features of a theory H are meant to include all known data that are 
relevant to the truth of H because of H's success, or failure, at explaining that data. In rare cases, the 
origin of a theory itself could be such a piece of data-for example, if a theory is a sociological 
theory concerning how scientific theories are developed. Because of problems this creates for the 
above definition, the ensuing discussion is not meant to be applicable to such theories. 
6At least in the case of Fresnel's bright spot, the latter appears to be the case. In a recent article 
John Worrall presents a convincing case that, contrary  to what Giere and  others claim,  the predic- 
tion of the bright spot by Fresnel's model played only a minor role in its acceptance (1989, pp. 135- 
157). 
7If the background information entails Q, then B0 will be a proper subset of the background 
information. If it does not entail Q, then B0 will simply be all the background information available at 
the time  H  was developed. 
8Under  the view  that  a theory  is some sort of  abstract object-e.g.,  a model-it  is somewhat 
paradoxical to speak of a theory H being designed to entail a set of data Q, especially if one thinks  
that abstract objects exist necessarily.  (It  would be like saying that 2 + 2 was designed to equal 4.) It 
is therefore perhaps better to say that H was initially selected, chosen, considered, discovered, or 
accepted because, when conjoined with background assumptions, it entails Q. Despite these points, for 
convenience I shall continue to speak of a theory as being designed to accommodate a set of data. 
Also, it should be noted that some philosophers  who accord a special epistemic    value to predic- 
tion define it in the sense of forecast: that is, H predicts Q if and only if H&B0  entails Q and H  was 
developed before data Q was discovered. With minor modifications, however, the argument given 
below  against SEP  also applies  if one uses  this definition. 
9Recall that, as defined earlier, the structural/relational features of a theory are the features 
pertaining to the structure of the theory, its relation to other background theories, and its relation to  
the  known data. 
10Such hypotheses usually cannot merely be considered part of the background assumptions, 
instead of part of Freud's theory, since generally there would be no independent evidence in favor of 
them. 
11 By directly affect, I mean affect without first affecting our confidence in the structural/relational 





12 Recall that the state of affairs corresponding to A (P) simply consists of the occurrence (nonoc- 
currence) of a certain set of psychological processes in the scientists who developed H: namely, those 
processes  involved in their attempting  to construct  a theory H such  that it entails  Q. 
13At least in those circumstances  involving  an "appropriate  test" (p.  278). 
14 Paul Horwich (1982, pp. 108-116), Jarrett Leplin (1984, p. 205, note 17), and John Worrall 
(1989, p. 155), among others, cite this as the reason why philosophers and scientists think that 
prediction has some special epistemic value. (Leplin and Worrall agree with the reason; Horwich does 
not.) Also, Keynes (1921, p. 304) credits C. S. Peirce  with  presenting a similar reason. Horwich's 
and Keynes's diagnoses of  what is wrong with the above reason, however,  are different from    mine. 
15 I' m assuming here that the truth ofH can explain why H correctly predicts Q only by explaining 
one of the three facts of which H's predicting Q consists: that is, H's entailing Q, H's not being 
designed to entail Q, and the existence of data Q. Sometimes one can explain why a conjunction of 
facts occurs without explaining the occurrence of any of the conjuncts: for example, one  could 
explain the correlation between the outputs of two causally connected random devices without 
explaining the output of either device by citing the causal relation between them. It does not seem that 
one can do this for the case at hand, however. For instance, consider how the truth  of  general 
relativity (GR) might explain GR's correct prediction of the bending of light around the sun (CPBL). 
The fact (CPBL) consists of the conjunction of three facts, (BL) & (D) & (E): light bends around the 
sun (BL) and Einstein did not design GR to entail BL (D) and general relativity entails that light  
bends around the sun (E). Clearly, since (E) is a necessary truth, the truth of GR cannot explain    why 
(E) is conjoined with (D) and (BL) except by explaining the occurrence of the conjunction (BL) & 
(D). And, it seems clear, the truth of GR-i.e., the curvature of space-time along with other facts 
about the world that GR asserts are the case-cannot explain the joint occurrence of (BL) and (D) 
except by explaining the occurrence of either (BL) or (D). 
16 Another way of seeing this point is to note that any other theory that entails Q will also explain 
why H's prediction of Q turned out to be correct, even if the other theory is incompatible with H. For 
example, any of the three known alternatives to general relativity (GR) can explain why GR's 
prediction of the degree to which light bends around the sun turned out to be correct, for they each 
entail that light bends to degree D, where Dis the correct degree of bending. Thus the truth of His the 
only adequate explanation of H correctly predicting Q if and only if no alternative theory exists that 
adequately explains Q. But if no such alternative theory exists, then the truth of H must also be the 
only adequate explanation of H's accommodating Q, for H's accommodating Q includes the fact that  
Q is the case. Consequently, if the truth of His the only adequate explanation of H's predicting Q, it 
must also be the only adequate explanation  of H's  accommodating   Q. 
17It should be noted here that my arguments for -SEP work for research programs as well as 
theories. Also, one can slightly modify my arguments above to show that prediction does  not have 
any special epistemic value with regard to the empirical adequacy of a theory or research program. 
180 f course, one could attempt to salvage this aspect of Lakatos's program by introducing, as John 
Worrall seems to do (1989), a new definition of 'novel prediction' that allows cases of accom- 
modation to count as cases of  novel prediction. Such definitions,  however,  appear quite far removed 
from  the intuitive  notion of  novelty  that seems to underlie  Lakatos's  views  and ones like his. 
19I wish to thank Arthur Fine, Bas van Fraassen, Vaughn McKim, Alvin Plantinga, and A. A 
Howsepian  for helpful comments  on earlier  versions of  this paper. 
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